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Slow and Steady Does Not Always Win the
Race: The Nuremberg Files Web Site and
What It Should Teach Us About
Incitement and the Internet
NADINE E. MCSPADDEN °
INTRODUCTION

When the tortoise raced the hare, the tortoise won because he moved at a slow, yet
constant, pace while the hare raced ahead in spurts, getting repeatedly distracted. This
fable, however, invites the question: Ifthe tortoise had seen a truck speeding his way,
sure to intersect with his path and flatten him, would he have continued at the same
pace toward impending doom, or would he instead have adjusted his speed to avoid
the collision entirely? The simple fact of the matter is that slow and steady does not
always win the race; in fact, sometimes, it may lead to destruction.
The Interet is a vast new medium of communication to which the law is still
adapting. The doors that the Internet opens to the average citizen offer unique and
exciting opportunities to acquire new knowledge and communicate with people
across the globe with relative ease. However, there are some people, inevitably, who
will choose to exploit this new medium, using cyberspace to wreak havoc and cause
violence.
The Nuremberg Files' is, according to some, an example of such a dangerous use
of the Internet.2 A dossier of information on abortion providers according to its
creators,3 or a virtual "hit list" providing a catalyst and the means to murder people
in the pro-choice movement across the country, according to its detractors.4 Whatever
one's opinion, the $107 million jury verdict against The Nuremberg Files's
maintainers' and permanent injunction against the electronic publication of
"personally identifying information" about the site's targets in PlannedParenthood
of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists6 should

* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1998,
Tufts University. I would like to thank Professor Daniel Conkle for helping me shape the topic
of this Note. Thank you to my family for their lifelong love and support. Finally, thank you to
Roger Deetz, who challenges me and brightens all my days. I dedicate this Note to Leland
McSpadden, who was an inspiration to all who knew and loved him.
I. TheNurembergFiles,athttp://www.netfreedomnet/nuremberg/index.html (last visited
Aug. 29, 2000).
2. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of
Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999).
3. See Leigh Noffsinger, WantedPosters,Bulletproof Vests, and the FirstAmendment:
DistinguishingTrue Threatsfrom Coercive PoliticalAdvocacy,74 WASH. L. REV. 1209, 1213
(1999).
4. See id. at 1213-15.
5. CourtneyMacavintaJudgeSlamsAnti-AbortionSite, athttp://news.cnet.comnewsO1005-200-339254.htrnl (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Judge Slams].
6. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1156 (D. Or. 1999). The site's authors were enjoined from
"publishing, republishing, reproducing and/or distributing in print or electronic form the
personally identifying information about plaintiffs contained in [The NurembergFiles] with
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provide a wake-up call to the American judicial system: we are not prepared to deal
with Web sites that may incite other people to commit lawless acts.
Incitement to violence is a category of speech that the First Amendment does not
protect, 7 and the current test for what speech counts as advocacy and what crosses the
line to incitement simply does not have any room for a Web site. The American
judicial system has always been, justifiably, reluctant to change substantive doctrine
without time, often decades, to peruse the possibilities. Some argue that the Internet
should be no different, that we should be slow and steady, figuring out the problems
as we go along and changing the law accordingly.8
This Note will seek to show that it is time for us to recognize the fact that as more
examples of potentially inciting Web sites infiltrate courtrooms across the country,
we are forcing juries to place a round peg in a square hole, and aberrational verdicts
will result. Part I examines the nature of the Internet, provides background
information on the case surrounding The Nuremberg Files, and describes the First
Amendment incitement and true-threats doctrines. Part II shows first how the
incitement doctrine does notreach Web sites and then analyzes The NurembergFiles
case, examining the jury's options and asking what those options should have been.
Finally, it acknowledges the reasons for us to be cautious in changing free speech
doctrine but argues that the Internet presents new dangers that our laws should be
prepared to face. The Internet is a wonderful tool but offers a dangerous opportunity
for people wishing to use it as a means for committing violent acts. The American
judicial system should recognize the impending doom and begin to adjust our speed
to move out of its path.
I. THE INTERNET,

THE NUREMBERG FILES, AND THE COURTS

The Internet is a massive resource, the likes of which the world has never before
seen. It connects people around the world by offering new and instantaneous methods
of communicating and transmitting information.9 This medium is entirely unique"
and, because of its uniqueness, presents new problems for our judicial bodies.
Analysis that courts have traditionally used for other broadcast media simply does not
apply to the Internet.
Because the American legal system has been slow to catch up with reality, we have
a case such as the one involving The NurembergFiles.This Web site was particularly
chilling, and when combined with the volatile social climate surrounding the issue of
abortion, the people placed on its list felt that their lives were in danger." The
immense verdict sparked celebration and protest across the country, but most legal
scholars focused on the implications for the First Amendment.' 2 Supreme Court
a specific intent to threaten." Id.The same prohibition applied to additional material not
already on the site. Id.
7. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
8. See Daniel T. Kobil, Advocacy On Line: Brandenburg v.Ohio and Speech inthe
InternetEra, 31 U. TOIL L. REv. 227, 250-51 (2000).
9. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851-52 (1997).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 20-28.
11. See Planned Parenthood,41 F.Supp.2d at 1133.
12. E.g., Internet Symposium: Legal PotholesAlong the Information Superhighway, 16
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precedent surrounding both the incitement 3 and true-threats 4 doctrines provides a
certain degree of assistance but ultimately is unhelpful because that doctrine simply
cannot apply to the Internet.
A. The Internet
Throughout the past decade, a technology revolution has quickly and quietly
consumed the United States. The Internet has already changed the way people
communicate, shop, recreate, and find information, and it will continue to do so for
decades to come. As of 1996, "[a]bout 40 million people used the Internet. . . , a
number that [was] expected to mushroomto 200 million by 1999." 5Formanypeople
in the United States, the Internet has become a part of daily existence. We work, play,
and talk to each other via chat rooms, E-mail, and Web sites. 6 The Internet, formany,
is a window to parts of the world we would not otherwise get to observe.
What we know today as the Internet is only a distant relation to its largely
inaccessible ancestor." Today, individuals can access the Internet from home via an
Internet Service Provider ("ISP") such as America Online or Prodigy, from cafes and
public libraries, from work, and from school. 8 Once a user gets "on-line," she has
access to an extremely diverse world of information and communication. 9 She may
have access to E-mail, enabling her to send an almost instantaneous electronic
message to another individual or group of individuals; "newsgroups," enabling her
to post her own and read others' comments on a particular subject; "chat rooms,"
enabling her to engage in real-time conversation with other users; and the World
Wide Web, enabling her, via Web "pages" or "sites," to "search for and retrieve
information stored in remote computers, as well as, in some cases, to communicate
back to designated sites."2 She may "navigate" the Web by typing in a known
address or by using a commercial "search engine" to search for key words. 2 "The

Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 541,550 (1996) [hereinafterInternet Symposium]; Kathleen M. Sullivan,
FirstAmendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1670
(1998).
13. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
14. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969).
15. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S..844,850 (1997). The Court furthernoted the rapid expansion
of the Internet, pointing to the number of "host" computers, which had skyrocketed from
"about 300 in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by... 1996." Id.
16. See id.
at 851-52.
17. The Internet grew out of a military project that began in 1969. See id. at 849-50. The
military wanted to ensure that, in the event of a war, all defense-related information would not
be lost. See id. at 850. Therefore, the project, called "ARPANET," created a network of
computers that enabled all defense-related entities to communicate with each other even ifparts
of the network were destroyed. See id. "While the ARPANET no longer exists, it provided an
example for the development of a number of civilian networks that, eventually linking with
each other, now enable tens of millions of people to communicate with one another and to
access vast amounts of information from around the world." Id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 851-52.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 852.
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Web is thus comparable, from the readers' viewpoint, to both a vast library including
millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering
goods and services."22
There are several characteristics which make the Internet an entirely unique
medium. First, the Internet places very low barriers to entry for both speakers and
listeners, both in terms of price and user-friendliness.' Second, the Internet provides
no spatial or geographical boundaries,24 so that it is just as easy for a New Yorker to
access the Louvre's home page as it is to access the Metropolitan Museum of Art's
home page. Third, the Internet allows for "real-time," or nearly instantaneous,
communication.' Fourth, Internet users can easily mask their identities by choosing
a pseudonymous E-mail address or "screen name."26 Finally, the Internet provides a
unique opportunity for many-to-many communication: "It's the first mass medium to
combine the intimacy and connectedness of one-to-one communication on the
telephone with the range and reach of one-to-many communications like broadcasting
and newspapers."27
The way that courts have traditionally dealt with the other media, such as radio,
television, and newspapers, renders a comparison between those media and the
Internet necessary." In addition to the factors listed above, there are several other
Internet characteristics that distinguish it from the more traditional media. First,
unlike radio and television, the Internet is a "user-driven" technology, meaning that
users have nearly total control over the information with which they come into
contact, and as a result, it is not as invasive as the traditional broadcast media.29
Second, while there is a history of significant government supervision and regulation
of the broadcast industry, the Internet has no history of and is not currently subject
to substantial government regulation.3" Third, while the rationale for much of the
regulation of the broadcast industry consisted of the scarcity of the airwaves, the

22. Id. at 853.
23. See, e.g., Internet Symposium, supra note 12, at 550; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1670.
24. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1667-68.
25. E.g., id. at 1668.
26. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 889-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
27. See Internet Symposium, supra note 12, at 550.
28. See.ACLU, 521 U.S. at 868-69.
29. See id. at 869 (noting that "'[c]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade' an
individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden' (quoting ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996))); Internet Symposium, supra note 12, at 555
(acknowledging that the Internet is the most user-driven technology since the book); Sullivan,
supra note 12, at 1668 (commenting that "[l]isteners use their own volition to 'pull' most
speech currently available on the Internet rather than having it 'pushed' at them from speakerinitiated and speaker-controlled central sources"). But cf FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726,748 (1978) (discussing how radio and television are somewhat nonvolitional and, as such,
"prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program
content").
30. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 868-69. But cf. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748 ("[O]f all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection.").
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Internet is far from a .'scarce' expressive commodity."'

Finally, unlike radio,

television, and newspapers, the Internet provides no editorial intermediary such as a
producer, host, or editor.32
Therefore, while the Internet provides opportunities that we could not have
imagined mere decades ago, it also folds a wrinkle into legal analysis. American
courts and legislatures have done as well as they can to catch up to the Internet, but
we are not there yet. Web sites such as The NurembergFiles point to whole new
areas of crime with which our laws are not currently equipped to deal.
B. The Nuremberg Files
As 1999 began, the United States focused its attention on a case in an Oregon
district court that began to open people's eyes as to how volatile and dangerous an
entity the Internet can be. The controversy centered around a Web site called The
Nuremberg Files that the American Coalition of Life Activists ("ACLA") and
Advocates for Life Ministries ("AILM") helped to maintain.3 These anti-abortion
groups used The NurembergFiles as a weapon in their struggle against the legality
of abortion, and much of the debate centered around the purpose of this site: it was
either a mere information-collecting device or a virtual "hit list."34 The legal battle
took place in the midst of a wave of violence against abortion providers and clinics,
and the defendants had, at different times, stated their support for "the use of 'force'
and justifiable homicide."'3 As the plaintiffs celebrated the $107 million jury verdict
against the defendants,36 the case sparked massive national debate and protest about
the sanctity of the First Amendment in the age of the Internet.37
However one may feel about the verdict, it is easy to see that this Web site was
particularly disturbing and contained some "chilling ingredients."3 The site contains
images of dripping blood on its main page.39 Moreover, it depicts dismembered

31. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870. In fact, scholars refer to the Internet's "abundance of
speech," Sullivan, supranote 12, at 1670, its constantly increasing "size and capacity," Internet
Symposium, supranote 12, at 555, and its "sprawling," "arguably boundless," and "pervasive"
nature, Adam R. Kegley, Note, Regulation ofthe Internet: The Application ofEstablished
ConstitutionalLawto DangerousElectronicCommunication, 85 KY. L.J. 997, 1002 (1997).
32. Internet Symposium, supranote 12, at 550-51; Sullivan, supranote 12, at 1671.
33. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willanette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1138, 1152 (D. Or. 1999); Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandaryof
Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson from the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 887 (1999);
Courtney Macavinta, Abortion "HitList" Slammed in Court,at http://news.cnet.com/news/01005-200-338167.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Hit List].
34. See, e.g., Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1213-15 (1999); Hit List, supra note 33, at
http:llnews.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-338167.html.
35. PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. The plaintiffs were a group of Planned
Parenthood employees and abortion providers who were targeted by the site. See id. at 1131.
36. E.g., Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, New Millennium, Same Old Speech:
Technology Changes,but the FirstAmendmentIssuesDon't,79B.U.L.REV. 959,975 (1999).
37. E.g., id. at 974-79; Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1211-15; Wardle, supra note 33, at
881-912.
38. Id. at 975.
39. The Nuremberg Files, supra note 1, at http://www.netfreedomLnet/nuremberg/
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fetuses in always grotesque and horrifying detail. 4' The most chilling portion of this
Web site, however, is a list.4 Although a list may seem innocuous, this central focus
of The NurembergFilesprovided personal information on "abortion providers, clinic
employees and clinic owners, law enforcement officials involved in securing access
to abortion services,judges, politicians, and abortion rights supporters."42 This list (at
one time) contained their names, their spouse's and children's names, addresses,
photos, license plate numbers, phone numbers, and various other private
information.43 Perhaps most frightening, there is also a list of hundreds ofnames, and
the typeface of each name varies according to the person's current health status: the
name is in black font if he or she is still healthy and working, shaded if he or she has
been wounded, and struck through if he or she has been killed." The authors refer to
their targets as "the baby butchers and their evil lackeys,' 45 calling for them to be
"'brought to justice.""
The ACLA, ALM, and other contributors to The NurembergFiles claimed that
their purpose in maintaining the site was only to collect and store information:
[C]ollecting dossiers on abortionists in anticipation that one day we may be able
to hold them on trial for crimes against humanity....
One of the great tragedies of the Nuremberg trials of Nazis after WWII was
that complete information and documented evidence had not been collected so
many war criminals went free or were only found guilty of minor crimes.
We do not want the same thing to happen when the day comes to charge
abortionists with their crimes. We anticipate the day when these people will be
charged in PERFECTLY LEGAL COURTS once the tide of this nation's opinion

index.html.
40. Id., at http://www.netfreedom.net/nuremberg/smdead.html.
41. Id., at http://www.netfreedom.net/nuremberg/aborts.html.
42. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1133 (D. Or. 1999); The NurembergFiles, supra note 1, at
http://www.netfreedom.netlnuremberglaborts.html.
43. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 36, at 975; Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1210;
Wardle, supra note 33, at 887; Hit List, supra note 33, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005200-338167.html. In fact, the site "urges people to send 'photos or videotapes of the
abortionist, their car, their house, friends, and anything else of interest, as many and as recent
as possible."' Hit List, supra note 33, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-338167.html
(quoting from the original The NurembergFiles, at http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity
(n.d.)). Now, the site should no longer contain that personal information, because the judge in
PlannedParenthoodissued a permanent-injunction against the publication of such data. See
PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56. The authors have, however, begun "testing
a new format" for the list, which provides the personal information of targeted people in the
pro-choice movement in the State of Maryland. The Nuremberg Files, supra note 1, at
http://www.netfreedom.net/nuremberg/MD.html.
44. The Nuremberg Files, supra note 1, at http://www.netfreedom.net/nuremberg
aborts.html.
45. Id.
46. Hit List, supra note 33, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-338167.html
(quoting from the original The NurembergFiles,at http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity
(n.d.)).
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turns against the wanton slaughterof God's children (as it surely will)."7

Thus, although these groups are in favor of the use of deadly force against people
involved in giving abortions,"8 they claimed that the reason for The NurembergFiles
was a peaceful one: to collect information in the event that abortion becomes illegal
in the United States. 9
However, the social climate of the United States at the time of the trial was such
that anyone involved with an abortion clinic had to take every hint of a threat of
violence very seriously." In addition to the Web site, Planned Parenthoodalso
concerned "wanted" posters that ACLA and ALM were distributing to fellow
abortion foes."' Violent members of the pro-life movement killed or wounded a vast
number of people involved in the pro-choice cause who had appeared on such posters
between 1993 and 1998.2 Dr. David Gunn, an abortion provider, was shot and
killed. 3 Dr. George Patterson, an abortion provider, was shot and killed.' Dr. John
BayardBritton, an abortionprovider, was shot andkilled; James Barrett; Dr. Britton's
volunteer escort, was shot and killed; and Mrs. Barrett, James Barrett's wife, was
wounded in the same shooting that killed her husband." Dr. Garson Romalis, a
Canadian abortion provider, was shot. 6 Two clinic workers were murdered and five
others wounded.' An off-duty police officer and nurse working in an abortion clinic
were killed when a bomb went off. Dr. Barnett Slepian, an abortion provider, was
shot and killed.' Far from being isolated events, the violent culture of this facet of
the anti-abortion movement continued to thrive. 9
The unrest that The NurembergFiles created in its targets was caused not only by
the overall social climate, but also by the fact that the Web site's maintainers, the
defendants in Planned Parenthood,were on record as supporting violence against

47. Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1213 (quoting The NurembergFiles,supra note 1, at
http://www.netfreedom.net/nuremberg/index.html (alteration, omission, and emphasis in

original)).
48. See PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
49. HitList, supra note 33, at http://news.cnet.conmnews/0-1005-200-338167.html.
50. See PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35.
51. See id.at 1134.
The Deadly Dozen poster contained the boldface heading "GUILTY of Crimes
Against Humanity" followed by another boldface heading, "THE DEADLY
DOZEN," and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of twelve people,
including three of the plaintiffs.... [T]he size and boldness of the print visually
emphasized the words, "GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY... THE
DEADLY DOZEN... $5,000 REWARD... ABORTIONIST."
Noffsinger, supranote 3, at 1214 (emphasis in original).
52. See PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.at 1135.
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abortion providers and their cohorts.' In fact, several of the defendants signed a
petition in support of the man who killed Dr. Gunn, calling the murder justifiable and
asking for an acquittal." One of the defendants subsequently stood outside an
abortion clinic where Dr. Yogendra Shah performed abortions and held up a sign
saying, "'Dr. Shah, do you feel under the Gunn?" 62 ALM put forth public praise of
Dr. Britton's assassin, stating: "'The man's a hero. May his tribe increase."'6 3 The
director of ACLA and ALM commented, "'[I]f someone was to conden any
violence against abortion, theyprobablywouldn'thave felt comfortable working with
us. ' ' '6 One result of The Nuremberg Files being introduced into such a volatile
climate was that the FBI notified the plaintiffs in PlannedParenthoodthat they
appeared on the Web site and advised them to take precautions.65
The fallout from the PlannedParenthoodcase has been significant for ACLA,
ALM, and The Nuremberg Files. First, the eight-person jury found that The
Nuremberg Filesand the "Deadly Dozen" posters were in violation of the Freedom
ofAccess to Clinics Entrances Act of 1994 ("FACE"),' that those entities were "true
threats" against their targets and as such were unprotected by the First Amendment,
and ultimately awarded the plaintiffs $107 million in damages.67 Second, MindSpring,
the ISP that had provided a virtual home for The NurembergFiles, shut down the

60. See id. at 1134, 1137.
61. See id.
at 1134.
The petition states inpart: We,the undersigned, declare the justice of taking all
godly action necessary to defend innocent human life including the use of force.
We proclaim that whatever force is legitimate to defend the life of a born child is
legitimate to defend the life of an unborn child. We assert that if Michael Griffin
did in fact kill David Gunn, his use of lethal force was justifiable provided it was
carried out for defending the lives of unborn children.
United States v.Dinwiddie,76 F.3d 913, 918 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996).
62. PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1137.
65. Id. at 1134. One article asks the reader to put herself in the position of the abortion
providers:
An FBI agent contacts you to offer twenty-four-hour protection and advises you
to purchase and wear a bulletproof vest. Terrified, you alternate which car you
drive to work, never allow your family to ride with you, and post an armed guard
outside your office.... Then you learn that three others pictured on posters and
named on the Web site have since been murdered. Your fear haunts you every
day....
Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1209-10.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). FACE "attaches both criminal penalties and civil liability to
activities by persons who use force, threat of force or physically obstruct persons obtaining or
providing reproductive health services." Melanie C. Hagan, The FreedomofAccess to Clinic
EntrancesAct andthe NurembergFilesWeb Site: Is the Site ProperlyProhibitedorProtected
Speech?, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 411, 415 (2000)(citations omitted).
67. See generallyPlannedParenthood,41 F.Supp.2d 1130; Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette,Inc. v.Am.Coalition ofLife Activists,No.CIV.95-1671-JO, 1999 WL
65450 (D.Or.Feb. 25, 1999). For more information about FACE, see United States v.
Dinwiddie,76 F.3d 913, 917,921-25 (8th Cir. 1996).
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Web site because it violated company policy.68 Finally, and arguably most
significantly, the judge who presided over PlannedParenthood,U.S. District Court
Judge Robert Jones, issued apermanent injunctionprohibitingACLA and ALM from
distributing abortion providers' personal information on "wanted" posters or"on the
NurembergFiles or any similar site."69 Thus, while the groups were able to maintain
parts of their Web site upon finding a new ISP, they are now entirelyprohibited from
publishing personal data on their original site or any sort of "mirror" site with
duplicate information. °
This case sparked national attention, both celebratory and outraged, because of the
potential danger and because of the great value the United States places on political
speech.7' Historically, the Supreme Court has defined both incitement 2 and true
threats, 3 two unprotected categories of speech, extremely narrow in order to protect
the most speech. More recently, one federal court was willing to extend the traditional
incitement doctrine to the printed word.7 4 Arguably, it is only another small step to
do the same for the Internet.
C. The Courts: Incitement and True Threats
The traditional First Amendment concern for and protection ofpolitical speech has
not lessened throughout the years. Among citizens and government, there has been,
since the United States's conception, a marked urgency to protect the vast majority
of political speech, whether it champions this country or argues for its downfall.75
However, there are two categories of speech that are unprotected by the First
Amendment, whether political speech or not. The government may prohibit and
punish speech that incites others to commit acts ofviolence76 and speech that contains
a true threat against another person.'

68. Patrick McMahon, Anti-Abortion Site Kicked Off Web, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 1999,
at 2A; Rose Aguilar, ISP Shuts Down AntiabortionSite, athttp://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-338353.htnl (last visited Feb. 2, 2001). The authors were able to find another ISP to
host their truncated Web page. See The Nuremberg Files, supra note 1, at
http://www.netfreedormnet/nuremberg/index.html. In fact, the authors have plans to expand the
site to include a live "Web cam" placed outside selected abortion clinics worldwide that would
provide live video streaming of women entering clinics. Id. The site predicts that "[t]he Live
Web Cam Project will make things get very interesting very fast." Id.
69. Judge Slams, supra note 5, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-339254.html.
70. PlannedParenthood,41 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
71. E.g., Calvert &Richards, supra note 36; Noffsinger, supra note 3; Wardle, supra note
33; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1963); Rice v. Paladin Enters.,
Inc., 128 F.3d 233,243 (4th Cir. 1997).
72. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
73. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969).
74. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 243-44.
75. E.g., id. at 243.
76. See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
77. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 76:485

1. Modem Incitement Doctrine
The modem test for whether speech falls into the incitement category comes from
a 1969 Supreme Court case, Brandenburgv. Ohio.78 In Brandenburg,the Supreme
Court overturned the punishment of a Ku Klux Klan leader, holding that the statute
under which he was convicted did not draw a sufficient line between incitement,
79
which is unprotected by the First Amendment, and advocacy, which is protected.
The test the Court announced in Brandenburg is the test that courts apply today
when determining whether particular speech is incitement or advocacy:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do notpermita State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or producesuch action.8"
This test is extremely protective of political speech. The speaker must incite lawless
action, the danger of such action must be imminent,the action must be likely to occur,
and the speaker must intend for it to occur.81 Thus, there is both a subjective
requirement-the speaker must intend to incite violence-and an objective
requirement-the violence must be likely to occur, from the point ofview ofsomeone
other than the speaker. Further illuminating its test, the Court quoted from an old
decision: "'[T]he mere abstract teaching... of the moral propriety or even moral
necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparinga group for
violent action and steeling it to such action."" In analyzing speech and determining
whether it falls into the Brandenburg definition of incitement, therefore, two
signposts the courts look to are whether the speech "prepares" and "steels" its
audience to commit imminent lawless action.
One of the more recent and provocative incitement cases was Rice v. Paladin
Enterprises,Inc.," which concerned a book entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manual
for Independent Contractors." This book explained, in gruesomely explicit detail,
how to become a contract killer and commit murder.85 The defendants argued that the
First Amendment offered them protection, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

78. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
79. See id. at 449; id. at 456-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). The defendant was prosecuted
for comments he made at a Ku Klux Klan rally. Among other things, he said: "'We're not a
revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues
to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some
revengeance [sic] taken."' Id. at 446.
80. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
81. Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalCaution, 1996 U. Clu. LEGAL F. 361,369 (1996).
82. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 448 (omission in original) (emphasis added) (quotingNoto
v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,297-98 (1961)).
83. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
84. Id. at 239.
85. Id.In this case, someone followed the instructions and committed a contractual murder.
The relatives and representatives of the victims sued the publisher, Paladin Enterprises, for
wrongful death, claiming that the publisher aided and abetted the killer by publishing the book.
See id. at 239-41.
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ultimately held that this book fell into the Brandenburgdefinition of incitement and,
as such, was unprotected.86
In analyzing Brandenburg and its applicability to the case at bar, the court
acknowledged that "abstract advocacy of lawlessness is protected speech."87
However, Hit Man, the'court held, was not abstract advocacy. First, speech was an
integral and inextricable part of the crime.88 Second, Brandenburg'simminency
requirement, the only one not fulfilled in this case, did not apply because it is only
pertinent "'where, as in Brandenburg itself, the government attempts to restrict
advocacy, as such."'" 9 Third, although the First Amendment may prevent the
proscription of speech based on mere foreseeability that its contents may be used for
an impermissible purpose, "it would not relieve from liability those who would...
intentionally assist and encourage crime and then shamelessly seek refuge in the
sanctuary of the First Amendment."' Fourth, the court held that just because a
message maybe disseminated to a wide audience does not automaticallyprovide First
Amendment protection.9 Finally, the court held not only that this speech did not fall
into Brandenburg's "mere advocacy,"' but that it "[was] the antithesis of speech
protected under Brandenburg."' 3 The book, in other words, had no value other than
to teach its readers how to commit murder.94
Thus, a federal court of appeals was willing to mold the Brandenburgdoctrine to
the modem era, when books such as Hit Man are written and published. The
incitement doctrine is still evolving along with society, as is the true-threats doctrine.
The plaintiffs in PlannedParenthoodproceeded under a true-threats theory, so it is
crucial to understand that doctrine as well as incitement for the purposes of this Note.

86. See id. at 247-51.

87. Id. at 243.
88. Id. at 245 (quoting United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted in original)).
89. Id. at 246 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF
BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROLLED BY
FEDERAL LAW, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAY BE SUBJECT TO

REGULATION CONSISTENT wiTHTHE FIRST AMENDMENTTOTm UNrrED STATES CONSTiTUTION
37 (1997) (footnote omitted in original)).
90. Id. at 248.
91. Id. The factors the court examined in determining that the publishers did "assist and
encourage" this crime were "the speaker's dissemination or marketing strategy,... the nature
of the speech itself," and whether "the audience both targeted and actually reached [was] ...
very narrowly confined ... ." Id. Using a slippery slope analysis, the court commented:

Were the First Amendment to offer protection even in these circumstances, one
could publish, by traditional means or even on the internet,the necessary plans
and instructions for assassinating the President, for poisoning a city's water
supply, for blowing up a skyscraper or public building, or for similar acts of terror
and mass destruction, with the specific... purpose of assisting such crimes-all

with immunity.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,448-49 (1969).
93. Rice, 128 F.3d at 249. The court further commented that this book "prepares and steels
its readers" to commit violent acts. Id. at 256.
94. See id. at 262 ("Ideas simply are neither the focus nor the burden of the book.").
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2. Another Puzzle Piece-the True-Threats Doctrine
Along with and closely related to incitement, true threats is a category of speech
that is unprotected by the First Amendment.95 The seminal true-threats case is Watts
v. UnitedStates,' in which a draft protester proclaimed that"' [i]f they ever make me
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J.""' The Court
distinguished between threats and protected speech, holding that the defendant's
statement was mere "political hyperbole," not a viable threat against the President.98
This short opinion has been interpreted manytimes throughout the decades, and there
seems to be a consensus among the circuits that threats are punishable as true threats
only when they are "so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the
person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution."" Thus, the courts are, in general, very protective even of threatening
speech and will allow it to be punished only when it reaches an extreme state of
potential dangerousness.
Among the factors that courts consider in determining whether particular speech
constitutes a true threat are the speaker's intent,"° the immediacy and clarity of the
speaker's purpose,"0 ' whether the speech is largely political opinion in nature,'02
whether the communication is inextricably intertwined with violent conduct, 3 the
speech's content and specificity of target,0 4 the overall context,0 5 and the audience
to which the speech is directed."
The Supreme Court has laid out two very important and time-honored categories

95. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 706.
98. See id. at 708.
99. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976); see also United States v.
Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (quoting the Kelner definition), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). However, the district judge
in PlannedParenthoodgave the following instructions to the jury regarding a true threat:
A statement is a 'true threat' when a reasonable person making the statement
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom it is
communicated as a serious expression of an intent to bodily harm or assault. This
is an objective standard-that of a reasonable person. Defendants' subjective
intent or motive is not the standard that you must apply in this case.
Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1237 (quoting Jury Instruction No. 10, Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am.Coalition of Life Activists, No. CIV. 95-1671-JO, 1999 WL
65450 (D. Or. Feb. 25, 1999)).
100. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1385-86; Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1226-28 (explaining
that speaker intent is both subjective and objective).
101. Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1991).
102. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1025.
103. Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027.
104. Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1218-20.
105. See id. at 1220-24 (examining surrounding facts, speaker demeanor, social atmosphere,
and violent history of a type of speech).
106. See id. at 1224-26 (remarking that speech directed to a specific target rather than to a
general audience is more likely to constitute a true threat).
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of unprotected speech: incitement and true threats. Rice took a step in updating
Brandenburg,but it still does not explicitly cover the Internet. The Court, justifiably
so, is reluctant to expand our notion of what speech is unprotected, but as
Brandenburgcurrently stands, Web sites can never incite someone to commit a
lawless act.'0 7
II. IT Is

I'ME TO RECOGNIZE OUR SHORTCOMINGS: WEB SITES
WILLNEVER MEET A BRANDENBURG STANDARD

The American judicial systemmust recognize the fact that there is a gaping hole in
the incitement doctrine as it currently exists. Because Web sites cannot meet the
0
"imminency" prong ofBrandenburg,"'
a court cannot find that Web sites fall into the
incitement category. Perhaps because of this reason, the plaintiffs in Planned
Parenthood chose to proceed with a true-threats argument," ° and while the jury
agreed with them,"0 it seems fairly clear that the jury was following its instincts
rather than the law. Had the jury been able to consider an incitement argument, which
seems to better fit the case, the outcome may have been less aberrational and certainly
more legal. Ultimately, while there are many valid reasons to be cautious in
reexamining the incitement doctrine in the age of the Internet, there are also very
serious reasons that we should hurry to begin the process.
A. Web Sites Do Not Fitinto CurrentAnalysis
Brandenburg gave us the modem incitement test, which had four components:
intent, imminency, likelihood, and gravity."' While the creators of a Web site may
have intent, and the gravity of the lawless conduct could be severe, itis uncertain how
courts will treat the "likelihood" prong. Possibly, the fact that a Web site is always
reaching a broad, general, unspecified audience will prevent it from being "likely" to
incite violence. Moreover, a Web site will never be able to fulfill the imminency
requirement.
Internet Web sites provide a fascinating paradox with which our judicial and
legislative bodies must eventually deal. When a Web page author creates a site, it is
instantaneously possible for people around the globe to examine and interact with
it." 2 However, because of the user-driven nature of the Internet and its massive3
depths, it could be a day, a week, or a year before a user accesses the Web page."
For that matter, it is conceivable that no user would ever stumble across that
particular site. Thus, on the one hand, "[over the Internet, information may reach a
mass audience in nearly real time, as quickly as it is available."' 4 On the other hand,

107. See infra text accompanying notes 108-18.
108. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); infra text accompanying notes
111-18.
109. Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1236.
110. See McMahon, supra note 68, at 2A.
111. See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
112. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1667-68.
113. See InternetSymposium, supranote 12, at 555.
114. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1668; see also Sunstein, supra note 81, at 364 ("With the
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there is no way to predict how long it will be before a user actually finds a specific
Web site.
One of the primary justifications for the imminency requirement is that if there is
time between the speech and the potential lawless conduct, there is time to rebut the
false, misleading, or dangerous speech." 5 Because of the potentially significant lag
time between a Web page's creation, a user accessing it, and ultimately acting on the
material found within it, there could be, arguably, sufficient time to rebut any
"inflammatory" speech to further undercut the imminency prong." 6 However, some
argue that, in fact, the Internet provides fewer opportunities for "good counsel" to
overtake the bad: "If inciters can customize access to a sympathetic audience and
reach them one by one, the public occasions for eavesdropping by those of good
counsel will be diminished. Likewise, the elimination of institutional filters
on the
' 7
Internet removes an extralegal source of restraint on subversive speech." "
Ultimately, though, Brandenburg'simminence prong can never be fulfilled by a
Web page. Because there is no way to know how much time will exist between a Web
page's conception and its first visitor, the risk of imminent unlawful conduct is
impossible to predict with any certainty. The problem with applying this analysis to
the Internet is that, if they do not already exist, there certainly someday could be a
Web page that, even if not discovered for ten years, would incite its visitors to
commit lawless acts."' However, the American courts should at least acknowledge
the fact that, under present First Amendment incitement doctrine, a Web page can
never run afoul of Brandenburg.
B. What We Should Learnfrom The Nuremberg Files
While the attorneys for the plaintiffs in PlannedParenthoodchose to argue that
The Nuremberg Files was a true threat rather than speech that was incitement to
violence," 9 the two doctrines are so closely related that they could have attempted
either one. Technically, a Web page could constitute a true threat and be punishable,
because the Brandenburgproblems do not exist." However, while The Nuremberg
Files arguably did not constitute a true threat, the plaintiffs may have argued their
case that way because incitement is not an option for a Web site.

touch of a button, it is now possible to reach millions of people, whether or not they want to
be reached.').
115. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1671.
116. Andrew P. Napolitano, Whatever Happened to Freedom of Speech? A Defense of
"State Interest of the Highest Order" as a Unifying Standardfor ErraticFirstAmendment
Jurisprudence,29 SETON HALLL. REv. 1197, 1257 (1999).
117. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1671.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 153-57.
119. Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1236.
120. The widely accepted definition of a true threat is speech that is "so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of
purpose and imminent prospect of execution." United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027
(2d Cir. 1976).
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1. What Did the Jury Do?

The first question we must ask ourselves is whether the PlannedParenthoodjury,
in bringing down a $107 million verdict on the defendants, followed the law or,
instead, applied a new and unfamiliar analysis. In finding that The NurembergFiles
constituted a true threat against the people listed within it, the jury, in all likelihood,
went beyond the confines of current true-threats doctrine.
The current doctrine is extremely limited, as the above definition clearly suggests.
True-threats cases point to a doctrine that courts, in general, interpret very narrowly.
A draft protester threatening the life of the President was engaging in "political
hyperbole," not true threats.'21 A person sending E-mails to a third party describing
the brutal abduction of a nonspecific woman who lived on his college campus was
not truly threatening because there was no specific discussion of an intent to act
imminently, and because the discussions were part ofprivate E-mails not intended for
public distribution." However, a series of threatening, harassing, indecent, and
profane phone calls and letters to a Jewish Organization did constitute a true threat,'"
and comments made on television that a group of people had planned Yasser Arafat's
assassination in detail did constitute a true threat.' 24
Although The Nuremberg Files is certainly threatening, as the FBI's precautions
suggest,'" it is debatable whether it meets the definition of a true threat. In fact, the
only criteria that the Web site clearly fulfills is specificity of target: the list of names.
The site did not list any dates, nor did it suggest any sort of time limit, thus
immediacy is not fulfilled. The PlannedParenthooddefendants had a (somewhat)
plausible explanation for the purpose of the site, and if courts are unwilling to make
inferences about unequivocal intent beyond what is in writing, then the site is likely
not unequivocal. Finally, ff an abortion doctor stopped providing abortions, his orher
name would likely have been taken off of the list; thus it is not an "unconditional"
threat. Clearly, therefore, it is a stretch to say that the jury followed the true-threats
doctrine as we know it.
2. What Might the Jury Have Done?
Instead ofproceeding with a true-threats argument, the plaintiffs might have chosen
to argue that this Web site incited others to commit acts of violence against the people
listed within it. Brandenburg protects "abstract advocacy of lawlessness,"'2 but
advocacy is not protected by the First Amendment "where [it] is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such

121. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
122. United States v. Baker, 890F. Supp. 1375,1386,1388-89 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff'dsub
nom. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). The court commented that
"drawing ... an inference [about intent to commit specific illegal acts] not grounded in any
specific language... would exceed the bounds of the First Amendment." Id. at 1389.
123. See United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1193 (7th Cir. 1990).
124. See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1028.
125. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
126. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
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The defendants in PlannedParenthoodclaimed that their intent in maintaining The
Nuremberg Files was merely to collect information, so that in the event abortion
becomes illegal in the United States, abortion providers would not be able to hide and
escape prosecution. 28 However, the Brandenburgintent test is both subjective and
objective, and the brutal and chilling nature of the Web site coupled with the violent
social atmosphere surrounding the abortion debate' leaves sufficient evidence for
ajury to find that a reasonable person would believe this site to be directed to inciting
violence against the people listed within it. Further, there is also evidence suggesting
that the defendants supported violence against people furthering the abortion cause
and that may have been sufficient evidence to find subjective intent as well.30
The gravity of the potential lawless action, wounding or murdering abortion
providers, clinic workers, and legal and judicial employees, is certainly sufficiently
extreme to qualify under Brandenburg.As for the likelihood that such violence
would have resulted, and putting the problems inherent to the Internet aside, one need
only examine the volatile social climate and inflammatory nature of the Web site to
determine that there is sufficient evidence to believe that once people found it, The
Nuremberg Files would have been very likely to incite people to commit acts of
violence. Moreover, it gave them all the necessary data to find the targets: addresses,
phone numbers, pictures, license plates, family members, and other personal
information.''

Above and beyond the explicit Brandenburgtest are factors that courts often take
into account when deciding an incitement case. First, the audience to which this Web
32
site was directed, as with any Web site, was a general, worldwide audience.
Anyone who happened upon this site, pro-choice or pro-life, would have seen the
bloody imagery and list of information. This is another problem inherent to Web
sites: the audience will always be general and broad, rather than a specific audience
who would be easy to rile up. Second, the nature of this speech is, at its heart,
political, which would afford it greater protection than nonpolitical speech.'
Finally, it is debatable whether this site prepared and steeled its audience to commit
acts of lawlessness; likely, there would be sufficient evidence on both sides for ajury
to come out either way.
The Hit Man book in Rice crossed the line from mere advocacy to incitement,
according to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals."u While Hit Man is an extreme
case, arguably more extreme than The NurembergFiles,the court's analysis is helpful
in determining whether the Web site would pass muster under Brandenburg.The

127. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
128. Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1213.
129. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134-36 (D. Or. 1999).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
131. Calvert & Richards, supra note 36, at 975; Noffsinger, supra note 3, at 1210; Wardle,
supra note 33, at 887; Hit List, supra note 33, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200338167.html.
132. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1667-68.
133. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
134. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 1997).
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court insisted that mere presentation to a wide audience is not dispositive where there
is evidence that, in reality, the audience that was targeted and reached was actually
quite narrow. 13 Like Hit Man, The Nuremberg Files targeted a specific (and
hopefully small) group: those pro-life people who are willing to support violence
against those who are apart of the pro-choice cause. Thus, that would be yet another
factor weighing against the PlannedParenthooddefendants in a Brandenburg-type
argument. However, because The NurembergFilesis a Web site, Brandenburgdoes
not reach iti.In fact, if someone decided to create a Web site for Hit Man, the law in
its current form would protect such information as a Web site, even though it is not
protected as a book.
Therefore, it is very possible that this Web site would meet Brandenburg's
incitement test ifa Web site could ever meet that test. In fact, the plaintiffs may have
decided to forego an incitement argument because a Web site's audience will always
be too general, Brandenburg'slikelihood requirement is difficult for a Web site to
fulfill, and the imminency requirement seems impossible foraWeb site ever to fulfill.
Thus, though The Nuremberg Files Web site is frightening and threatening to its
targets, 13 6 the law in its current state arguably offers total protection to the site's
creators.
3. What Should the Jury Have Been Able to Do?
Whether or not one agrees with the outcome ofPlannedParenthood,it seems fairly
clear that the jury followed its instincts rather than the law. The NurembergFiles is
a disturbing, chilling Web site that very likely could have provoked someone to
commit an act of violence against an abortion provider or, at the very least, offered
sufficient information for those people who alreadyplanned on doing so to find their
targets with ease. However, it was not a true threat as courts currently apply the
doctrine. Further, while the attorneys did not proceed under an incitement theory, the
site may have fit into Brandenburgif not for the problems inherent to Web sites that
make Brandenburgan awkward fit in general.
Given what it had to work with, the jury did the best job it could have done. It is
time, however, to acknowledge the fact that current incitement doctrine simply does
not allow room for a Web site to fall within its boundaries. The law, as it stands,
requires juries contending with Web sites, such as The Nuremberg Files,to force a
round peg into a square hole. Certainly, creating new doctrine or changing a wellestablished legal calculus to account for societal changes is no small task and should
not be undertaken lightly. At the least, however, the American judicial system must
acknowledge the fact that there is no room for the Internet in current incitement
doctrine.

135. Id. at 248.
136. See Planned Parenthood of the Colurnbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1133-34 (D. Or. 1999).
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C. Slow and Steady Has Its Benefits
There are many serious and valid reasons why the legislative and judicial bodies
across the country should hesitate before carving some sort of new niche for
unprotected Internet speech. Some are time-honored arguments for freedomofspeech
in general, and others are specific to the unique nature of the Internet as a new
medium of communication.
1. Time-Honored Reasons to Protect Speech
First, one of the great rationales for protecting freedom of speech is to keep the
channels of political debate open and allow people to speak freely without fear of
punishment for their words or ideas. 37 The Supreme Court has recognized a
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."'38 In
order to maintain an atmosphere of robust public debate, the government must be
especially hesitant to proscribe new categories of speech. If people are afraid of
government action, there will be a chilling effect on the speech itself. In fact, one
scholar argues that ifcourts begin to censure Internet speech, especially with verdicts
of the magnitude in PlannedParenthood,there will be a "direct and chilling effect
...to suppress speech."' 39
Second, courts have often likened certain forms of public protest to the "poor
man's printing press."' 40 Activities such as leafleting and picketing have historically
been more accessible to low-income people than publishing books, so courts have
been especially wary of regulating that speech which is accessible to all.14 ' While
using the Internet is certainly more expensive than marching down a public street,
access is relatively cheap,' and "as the most participatory form of mass speech yet
developed, the Internet deserves the highest protection from governmental
intrusion."'4
Finally, and especiallyrelevant to Web sites such as The NurembergFiles,we must
be careful about forcing dissenting opinions underground.'" While it may be
tempting, for some, to silence and immobilize people who are prepared to paint their

137. E.g., N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
138. Id.; see also Rice, 128 F.3d at 243.
Even in a society of laws, one of the most indispensable freedoms is that to
express in the most impassioned terms the most passionate disagreement with the
laws themselves, the institutions of, and created by, law, and the individual
officials with whom the laws and institutions are entrusted. Without the freedom
to criticize that which constrains, there is no freedom at all.
Id.
139. Wardle, supra note 33, at 887-88.
140. E.g., United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72,79 (2d Cir. 1966).
141. See id.
142. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1670.
143. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
144. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 36, at 969.
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disagreement with government policy in ugly, vivid, explicit, and dangerous colors,
it would be extremely unhealthy for our society to instill that practice. Many scholars
believe that allowing dissenters to express their vehement and caustic opinions
operates as a sort of "safety valve," enabling people to blow off steam with words
rather than blowing off someone's head with a gun. 4 5
The time-honored reasons for protecting the freedom of speech are certainly still
relevant to modem problems. Above and beyond our historical rationales, however,
are reasons specific to the Interet that should lead us to pause before hampering its
current total freedom.
2. New and Internet-Specific Concerns
The Interet is different from other media for a variety ofreasons, 146 so many of the
rationales the government has traditionally used for regulating the media will not
apply to the Interet. First, the Internet is a largely user-driven medium 47 Unlike
radio or television, there is only a small chance that a user might accidentally happen
upon inappropriate material. 48 However, that argument cuts both ways: users who are
looking for an inflammatory site such as The NurembergFiles will be able to access
it with the push of a button, rather than being at the mercy of radio and television
programming. Second, some argue that the Internet provides ample time to rebut
volatile or dangerous information, and, as such, the government should hesitate to
create new categories ofproscribedIntemet speech.'49 However, because the Internet
is so user-driven, the opportunity for people not looking for a particular Web site to
rebut the information contained within it is seriously diminished. 5 '
Third, the link between words and actions that must exist for the incitement
doctrine, which some people believe is tenuous to begin with, becomes even more
attenuated with a Web site. When a user comes across an inflammatory Web page,
he or she must then make the mental leap to want to act, prepare to act, and then,
finally, act. There are some who believe "[t]hat the printed word can ever be an
incitement to immediate action is troubling.... Human agents, not printed words,
commit acts of violence."'' However, the advent of Rice shows that courts are
willing to move beyond such simplistic analysis and confront the reality that books
can incite someone to commit a lawless act.5 While, admittedly, HitManwas a truly
extreme example of incitement, there is no reason to believe that such information
will never be available on the Internet. Thus, when the judicial system showed its
willingness to extend the incitement doctrine to the printed page, it took one step
toward legitimating the link between word and deed. Arguably, however, that link is
more attenuated when the information is coming from a Web site instead of a book.
Thus, there are many valid and justifiable reasons that we should be mindful of

145. See id.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 23-32.
147. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997); Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1668-69.
148. See InternetSymposium, supra note 12, at 555.
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when considering changing a First Amendment doctrine. One of the fundamental
principles upon which our society rests is that of the freedom of speech, a precious
freedom which no one wants to see diminished. However, there are also serious
considerations that should prod us to act soon, before the American judicial system
is confronted with yet another case it is not prepared to handle.
D. Slow and Steady Can Lead to Destruction
The Internet is a precious medium of communication that our society should
attempt to protect from extensive government regulation. However, it can and will
likely someday be a tool of dangerous groups, used to instruct, inflame, and commit
acts of violence. Because of several of its unique features, the Internet is particularly
vulnerable to groups wanting to use it for the global dissemination of dangerous
information.
There are already many hate groups communicating on the Internet, using its
various resources to transmit frightening and repugnant information. Over fifty hate
groups currently communicate on the Internet, discussing conspiracies and providing
bomb-making formulas to their cyberspace visitors." The Anarchist's Cookbook,
The Terrorist'sHandbook,and the National Rifle Association's bulletin board are
all available to instruct viewers in bomb-making techniques, sometimes with simple
household objects such as baby food jars." Perhaps more disturbing than bombmaking instructions are the sites that tell their users "how to form guerrilla cells and
how to harm federal agents."' 55
All ofthe above examples exist, according to their creators, "solely for informative
purposes"" and, as such, are protectedby the First Amendment. However, one does
not have to make a great leap in logic to see the potential for a Web site, someday, to
cross the line between informative purposes and incitement to horrific violence. The
NurembergFiles, according to some, is such a site, but even ifthat particular example
does not cross the line, it is not difficult to imagine one that will. "It is likely, perhaps
inevitable, that hateful and violent messages carried over the... Internet will
someday be responsible for acts of violence."'" When such a site comes into
existence that expressly directs its viewers to commit lawless acts, the legal
community should have a test in place that will allow for its proscription.
There are several reasons why the Internet is particularly vulnerable to hate groups
and future messages of violence. First, its low cost leaves it accessible to many
people, and many public places such as libraries allow patrons to access it for free. '8
While in many ways this is a positive feature of the Internet, it is also frightening
because of the potential for mass distribution and violence. "We're seeing old hate
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materials taken off carwindshields and lockerrooms andput on theIntemet.... Here
is a great marketing tool to get into the mainstream of America."'5 Thus, while we
should allow everyone to create Web sites and bulletin boards for "informative
purposes," the Internet's accessibility for all creates potential for dangerous
exploitation of its resources.
Second, at the present time, there is virtually no regulation of the Internet. Unlike
radio and television, there is no host or producer acting as an intermediary who must
approve the information that goes out on the airwaves. 60 Not only is there no primary
filter through which Web sites must go, but also there is no secondary one either:
"[N]either the public library nor the local private bookstore can use its standards of
taste, decorum, market judgment, or consideration of the sensibilities of other
customers to filter out access to publications on such violence-abetting topics as how
to build explosives or to commit a murder for hire."'6 Thus, at the present time, if
someone chose to put Hit Man, in all its gruesomely explicit detail, online, it would
immediately be accessible to every Internet user.
Third, this information will be available to people in real-time." While a book
such as HitManwill be put on shelves in bookstores, people must wait for the store
to be open before browsing, finding it, buying it, and taking it home to read; if it were
a Web site uploaded at two o'clock in the morning, millions of people across the
globe could access it instantaneously, following its instructions and killing someone
by dawn. The personal information on abortion providers that The NurembergFiles
contained was immediately accessible to all violently passionate people across the
country, and they could have used that information to wound or kill the people on the
list within hours of its creation.
Finally, and perhaps most frighteningly, the Internet offers an opportunity never
seen before: extremely cheap, instantaneous, world wide distribution." Rather than
someone shouting at the top of his lungs from a picket line to the tens or hundreds of
people in the immediate area, and possibly making the local news, Web sites are
accessible to anyone in the whole world who has Internet access. Rather than an
audience. of hundreds, or even thousands, Web sites have a potential audience of
millions, perhaps tens of millions.'"
When messages advocating murderous violence are sent to large numbers of
people, it is possible to think that the Brandenburg calculus changes:
Government may well have the authority to stop speakers from expressly
advocating the illegal use of force, at least if it is designed to kill people. The
calculus changes when the risk of harm increases because of the sheer number of
people exposed.' 65
Granted, the audience is only potential: people must first find a Web site before
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taking in the information that it provides. Ultimately, though, the utter massiveness
of the Internet should urge legislative and judicial bodies across the country to face
this problem before a situation develops with which the law cannot currently deal.
The Nuremberg Files presented such a problem, and when the jury was forced to
choose between following a law that does not accommodate Web sites or following
its instincts about the ideal outcome, it chose the latter. Whether or not we condone
thejury's decision, it is clear that the American legal systemmust take account of this
new medium presenting new problems with which the law is not equipped to deal.
CONCLUSION

The Internet is changing American society, especially the way we communicate
with each other, to such an extent that it is difficult to keep up with the changes.
There have been hateful groups of people trying to get a message out for as long as
there have been people; that will likely never change. What has changed, however,
is that now the Internet provides a means for dangerous sects of society to inflame
and endanger others. Our judicial system shows a natural and justifiable reluctance
to alter its legal doctrine, but if it continues at this slow and steady pace, society will
quickly pass it by. Somehow, the courts and legislatures must recognize the fact that
at the present time, the law does not accommodate the scenario of a Web site that
incites others to commit lawless acts. That recognition must come soon, or else we
will be like the tortoise, crushed by the vehicle that he saw coming from miles away.

